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The relevance of taboo language: an analysis of the indexical values of swearwords. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The assumption that the use of a particular word or linguistic resource can produce 
(im)politeness effects in some contexts, but not in all, is uncontroversial.  For example, 
scholarship that addresses swearing as (im)politeness behaviour has repeatedly shown that, 
as a resource, taboo language can be used to generate a number of communicative effects 
in different contexts (see, for example, Brown and Levinson, 1987; Daly et al., 2004; 
Rogerson-Revel, 2007; Jay and Janschewitz, 2008; Stenstrom, 2006; Dewaele, 2010; 
Johnson, 2012).  However context, as a concept that can explain variation in the effects 
generated by a single linguistic resource, is often under-theorised, even when apparently 
well-theorised phenomena, such as ‘communities of practice’, are invoked as context.  My 
contention in this paper is that, in particular, the processes by which key aspects of context 
come to have a bearing on specific evaluations of a linguistic resource are often left under-
examined.  My aim in this paper is to develop a discursive pragmatic approach to 
(im)politeness phenomena, that draws on recent developments in the theorisation of 
indexicality, and which raises questions about the processes that generate context-specific 
evaluations of swearword use.  From a politeness perspective, this approach is useful for the 
analysis of any linguistic resource, but my aim here is to propose that such an approach 
allows questions about the scope, the power, and the workings of the indexical potential of 
strong swearwords to be formulated and addressed.  
In this paper I take a ‘discursive approach’ to (im)politeness to be an approach that 
roughly maps onto Culpeper’s (2011:122) account: it is an approach that is concerned with 
“participants’ situated and dynamic evaluations of politeness”.  However, as I hope to show, 
adopting such an approach does not necessarily generate the problems that Culpeper (122) 
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points to.  I hope to demonstrate that the questioning of generalisations, which characterises 
discursive approaches, does not (as the scholarship cited by Culpeper argues) necessarily 
lead to an inability to go beyond the descriptive, and does not necessarily lead to the 
redundancy of the analyst.  In what follows I take (im)politeness phenomena to be 
communicative resources that can be shown to be subject to politeness evaluations 
(whether these are etic or emic; first order or second order evaluations).  The discursive 
approach to (im)politeness I develop in this paper takes as a point of departure some of the 
insights brought into view by the ‘third wave’ approach to sociolinguistic phenomena (Eckert, 
2012)i.  I propose that, by adopting this approach, it is possible to map out the indexical 
potential of specific linguistic resources, such as swearwords by addressing the processes 
by which “meanings become associated with social categories or with variables” (Eckert, 
2008:455).  I extend the sociolinguistic approach to indexicality by adding a pragmatic 
dimension, informed by key tenets of Sperber and Wilsons (1986) relevance theory.  My aim 
in doing so is to propose that such a methodology would bring into view factors that inform 
the social meanings that communities appear to attribute to linguistic resources, and also 
help to explain individual attributions of social meaning to specific uses of linguistic 
resources, without addressing such meanings as nonce interpretations, or as affirmations or 
rejections of the ‘conventionalised’ meanings attributed to such resources.  I conclude with 
an analysis that is designed to show how it might be possible to move beyond speculation 
about what a resource does or does not signify within a given culture at a given moment. In 
pointing to regularities of situated evaluative behaviour, that can be observed and 
documented, my goal is also to provide a set of parameters for inferring the meanings 
generated by local, context-specific uses of swearwords.   
3 
McEnery (2006, 2) explicitly links swearing with offence, but also posits a context 
within which an offence would occur, arguing that the term ‘bad language’ in his work refers 
to “any word or phrase which, when used in what one might call polite conversation, is likely 
to cause offence”.  McEnery does not engage with the concept of ‘polite conversation’ in any 
depth, but his claim is consistent with other academic treatments of swearing.  For example, 
Allan and Burridge (2006:2), who term swearwords as ‘dysphemisms’ (in contrast with 
‘euphemisms’), propose: 
In order to be polite to a casual acquaintance of the opposite sex, in a formal 
situation, in a middle class environment, one would normally be expected to use the 
euphemism or orthophemism rather than the dispreferred counterpart.  The 
dispreferred counterpart would be a dysphemism. (34-5). 
 
Although both the above works relate offence to context, in what follows I focus primarily on 
two swearwords, fuck and cunt, because these have been described in the literature as 
amongst the most strongly offensive swearwords in British English in any context (see, for 
example, Millwood-Hargreave, 2000:9-10; McEnery, 2006:35; Stone et al., 2010:53).  The 
offensiveness of these terms is often perceived as a function of their ‘taboo’ status (Allan 
and Burridge, 2006; McEnery, 2006).  As Stapleton (2010:289) argues: “Swearing is a 
linguistic practice based on taboo, or that which is forbidden”.  Although there is clearly a link 
between the offence caused by a swearword and its taboo status, as I show in Section 2, 
studies of (im)politeness behaviour that analyse instances of the context-specific meanings 
of swearword use tend to support the less theorised claims cited above. 
In Section 3 I survey sociolinguistic and anthropological scholarship on indexicality 
with the aim of demonstrating how this approach has the potential to open up a useful set of 
research questions that might add an explanatory layer to the analysis of swearword use.  In 
Section 4, I demonstrate how a discursive pragmatic approach that builds on the notion of 
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indexicality can be used to describe and explain the indexical potential of items of taboo 
language. 
2 SWEARING IN POLITENESS RESEARCH 
I have proposed above that scholarship in the field of politeness has shown that the 
interactional effects of swearwords are context-dependent.  In this section, I provide a brief 
illustration of how such studies have supported these claims, focusing on just two: Culpeper, 
Bousfield and Wichmann (2003), who have shown that, where the intention is to cause 
offence, the use of a swearword can function as an impoliteness strategy; and Daly et al. 
(2004) who have shown that swearing can also express solidarity when it functions as a 
positive politeness strategy.   I conclude this section with a brief summary of Culpeper’s 
(2011) argument that the meanings associated with swearwords are conventionalised, rather 
than conventional, (see section 2.2) and his proposal that this accounts for the range of 
context-specific effects they are able to generate.   
 
2.1 Swearing as an impoliteness strategy and a positive politeness strategy 
Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann’s (2003:1550) analysis of the following exchange 
illustrates how swearing can function as an impoliteness strategy.   In what follows S1 is a 
traffic warden and S2 owns a car that has just received a parking penalty.   
S1:                        I’m afraid I have sir= 
S2: you have no authority to put a ticket on a disabled err car             = why didn’t 
you 
 
S1:    I’d . what do you mean I did do it before   
S2: do it before then                      I’ve parked here every day because I have a  
 
S1:       yes sir         I never really 
S2: prescription from the chemist you don’t put any tickets on my car and then and 
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S1:         I’m not I’m not always down here sir 
S2: then you just come in and out of the blue and put one on            ohh fuck off 
 
The italics are in the original, and signal the element of the exchange that the authors are 
focusing on at this point. The argument here is that a key criterion for distinguishing between 
politeness and impoliteness is the aim of the speaker, specifically “whether it is the 
speaker’s intention to support face (politeness) or to attack it (impoliteness)” (2003:1550). 
The authors argue that the above exchange “contains an offence which aims at aggravating 
the face of the intended recipient” (1550) and is an example where an offending person is 
acting “with the intention of causing open insult” (1550).  In proposing that the italicised 
element, i.e. the words ‘ohh fuck’, is ‘an offence’ in this exchange, Culpeper et al. illustrate 
how this swearword can function as an impoliteness resource.  
 There is also evidence in the literature that swearwords can function as a politeness 
resource.  For example, Daly et al. (2004) offer evidence of an alternative effect generated 
by the use of fuck, arguing that in some contexts its use can express solidarity.  This claim is 
supported by an appeal to community of practice norms.  The following is an extract from a 
conversation that takes place in a New Zealand factory between two men who work on a 
packing line putting soap powder into boxes: Russell and Lesia.  Lesia has responsibility for 
the planning of work-shifts.  The material in brackets indicates the elements of the turn that 
were difficult to transcribe because machine noise is affecting the audibility of the interaction.  
Russell:  fucking sick of this line (Lesia) 
Lesia:          [voc] 
Russell:  stuck here all the time 
Lesia:  if you I put you on that line you’re getting worse 
Russell:  ( ) 
Lesia:  fucking worse + slow like an old man (all you have to just) + + 
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Russell: that’s what I want + + + 
Lesia:  if I put on that line you falling asleep (6) 
Russell: how much do we have to do on here 
(Daly et al., 2004:952) 
 
The authors gloss the content of this exchange in the following way:  
Russell is complaining that he is fed up with being on this packing line ...while Lesia 
argues back that any other line would be worse because Russell would find it too 
slow and boring. (952) 
 
Daley et al. argue that if, drawing on Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness, Russell’s 
direct complaint in line one was classified as a face threatening act, it would be expected 
that the speaker “would use some kind of linguistic politeness strategy to attenuate the 
impact of his complaint” (952).  However, as the authors point out, Russell does not do this, 
but instead uses the word fucking “thus apparently boosting or intensifying the insult value of 
his FTA” (952).  They argue that to interpret the socio-pragmatic meaning of the utterances 
in their data it is necessary to draw on wider ethnographic information as well as to consider 
other examples of complaints by the community of workers they are studying.    On this 
evidence, the authors (952) propose the following explanation of Russell’s behaviour: 
These men are on such good terms that they can swear at each other, not only with 
impunity, but with positive affect.  Forms of fuck appear to act as markers of solidarity 
and positive politeness for members of this community of practice.   
 
 As both the above studies show, the effect of the lexeme fuck is dependent upon the 
way it is evaluated within a specific context.  However, as I have suggested elsewhere 
(Christie, 2005:5-6), such claims tend to be predicated on the assumption that there is an 
already-existing shared understanding that such swearwords are normally face threatening.  
Daly et al. (2004:960) explicitly state this when they conclude: 
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The inherent strength of the canonical expletive fuck thus contributes to its impact 
when used between friends and co-workers.  It is as if they are saying “I know you so 
well I can be this rude to you.” 
 
And although Culpeper et al. (2003) do not explicitly state that the expletive fuck has an 
inherent pragmatic force, in proposing that the utterance they are analysing contains “an 
offence which aims at aggravating the face of the intended recipient” (2003:1550), and since 
the italicised element of their data is the word fuck, in this instance they are treating the word 
fuck as ‘an offence’. Although the authors are not proposing that the word always functions 
in this way it would appear that, unless there is a reason to justify an alternative 
interpretation, the evaluative process does not need to be made explicit.  A sort of ‘out of 
context’ (Culpeper, 2011:124) evaluation holds. 
 
2.2 Conventionalised meanings of swearwords 
The complexity of explaining the effects of swearing within (im)politeness research is nicely 
illustrated by Culpeper’s (2011) account of a personal experience related by one of his 
informants.  The informant, a young British man, tells of how he and his parents were having 
a meal with the informant’s Norwegian friend, and of how the friend repeatedly used the 
word cunt when telling anecdotes (in English) about mutual friends.  The informant 
observes: 
I knew Eddie uses this word in the place of words like ‘guy’ and ‘dude’.  In our circle 
of friends “Hi cunt” was a friendly greeting.  However, my parents weren’t to know 
this…. (Culpeper, 2011:116) 
 
The informant goes on to add that he “wanted everyone to get along, but difference in their 
language use was causing offence” (2011:116).  As Culpeper argues, it is likely that the 
parents would have perceived the use of the word as misjudged and, although they may 
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have been somewhat offended, the offence is unlikely to have been “exacerbated by a 
construal of intentionality”.  He adds that the offence is likely to have been “mitigated by an 
understanding that it is miscommunication” (2011:116).  What is interesting about this 
example of swearword use is that it shows what happens when there appear to be two or 
more sets of value systems involved in the interpretation of a linguistic resource.  For the 
informant, it would appear that the word has the potential to be relatively neutral in its effects 
in certain contexts, and this is explained by his experience of its use as part of “a friendly 
greeting”.   
 Culpeper’s account here acknowledges the instability of meanings emphasised by 
discursive approaches to politeness, but takes issue with aspects of the discursive stance.  
He proposes that the repeated appeals to context proposed by such approaches, which 
“challenge old modules of communication”, tend to “give the erroneous impression that it 
does not matter what you say” (116).   And he describes discursive approaches to politeness 
in the following terms: 
discursive studies downplay, partly for rhetorical reasons, shared conventions of 
meaning, instead emphasising that meanings are very unstable, negotiable and 
fuzzy and that communication is a very uncertain business. (2011:123) 
 
Instead, Culpeper makes a case for how evaluations of uses of impoliteness formulae such 
as swearwords tend to be relatively stable because they are constrained by the 
conventionalised associations that interlocutors share.  He argues that this is evident from: 
the commonplace fact that people have opinions about how different expressions 
relate to different degrees of politeness or impoliteness out of context, and often 
opinions which are similar to others sharing their communities.  They must have 
some kind of semantic knowledge; or to put it another way, the pragmatics of these 
expressions must be semantically encoded in some way.  (2011:124) 
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Drawing on Terkourafi (2008), Culpeper makes the point that this semantic knowledge is 
‘schematic knowledge’ in that it relates to conventionalised (rather than conventional) 
meanings, that is to say, such meanings are arrived at through a process in which “particular 
expressions are associated in one’s mind with particular contexts” (129).   
 Culpeper refines his own position on the significance of context by distinguishing it 
from that of Tracy and Tracy, who make a distinction between ‘context-spanning strategies’ 
and ‘context-tied strategies’: the former are impoliteness strategies that have the same effect 
across different situations of use, and the latter are strategies that can be “neutralised or 
even face enhancing” in certain contexts of use (Tracy and Tracy cited in Culpeper, 
2011:117).  Culpeper rejects an earlier opinion he had held, that certain forms of taboo 
language can be context-spanning strategies (116), and his point in citing his informant’s 
experience is to illustrate how the effects of “negative behaviours/formulae” (116) are 
depend on context of use.  However he does not propose a ‘discursive’ explanation of this 
context-dependency.  Indeed he maintains that the effects of some linguistic formulae, 
including the saying of certain swearwords using specific intonational contours, are 
sufficiently “conventionalised” to be seen as impolite in any context: 
Consider, for example, cunt dropped into the frame of you X, delivered with a sharply 
falling intonation and stress on cunt, and an expression of disgust.  I would suggest 
that this is unlikely to be taken as neutral in many different situations.  (2011:117)  
 
As Culpeper points out, this does not mean that a conventionalised expression of 
(im)politeness will always be interpreted as (im)polite.  The example of the Norwegian 
speaker indicates that such an interpretation can always be cancelled in context (129): 
Whilst impoliteness formulae can be highly conventionalised, it is not so clear, in my 
view, that generally they can ever be as fully conventional as non-politeness 
concepts, such as land, water, sky, etc.  For example, cunt was generally viewed as 
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the most offensive word in British English in the year 2000 (Millwood-Hargreave 
2000).  But we saw an example [...] in which it was not used for impoliteness. (127)  
 
This position is a useful starting point, but it raises many questions about the process by 
which such evaluations are ascribed to linguistic resources.   
 In arguing, for example, that the meanings of linguistic resources are arrived at 
through a process in which “particular expressions are associated in one’s mind with 
particular contexts” (129), one question that remains unanswered is how are these 
associations generated?  And for whom are these associations generated?  To pre-empt a 
set of questions asked by Agha (2003:242) which I will address further in section 2.2 below: 
what is involved in claiming that such cultural evaluations exist at all?   And for whom do 
they exist?    I propose that in order to address questions about cultural evaluations of 
(im)politeness resources, such as swearwords, we need to look to both sociolinguistics and 
pragmatics.  In the remainder of this paper I ask what, precisely, are we assuming about the 
social and cultural context of language use and language users when we attempt to account 
for evaluations of strong swearwords?  I also ask how, in pragmatic terms, we can account 
for the processes that lead swearwords to trigger one evaluation in one context and a 
different evaluation in another.  Although my approach is discursive, I do not assume that 
because language users may evaluate swearwords differently to each other, that it does not 
matter what we say, or that the analyst is redundant. And neither do I propose that 
communication is, for the most part, an ‘uncertain business’. 
 In addressing the questions I have posed, I build on recent developments in the 
theory of indexicality.  I argue in particular that although the notion of indexicality is 
essentially pragmatic, in recent years it has been employed as a sociolinguistic concept.  My 
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aim is to show that if the pragmatic roots of indexicality are brought back into play, it raises 
interesting questions about the role of context in the evaluation of (im)politeness resources. 
3 INDEXICALITY 
Ochs glosses indexing in the following terms: 
To index is to point to the presence of some entity in the immediate situation at hand.  
In language, an index is considered to be a linguistic form that performs this function. 
[…] A linguistic index is usually a structure (e.g. sentential voice, emphatic stress, 
diminutive affix) that is used variably from one situation to another and becomes 
conventionally associated with particular situational dimensions such that when that 
structure is used, the form invokes those situational dimensions (Ochs, 1996:411).  
 
She theorises this ability to assign meanings to linguistic resources as a form of cultural 
competence that a novice, for example a child or a newcomer to a culture, accrues in the 
process of becoming a member of the world s/he is entering. Ochs argues for an ‘indexicality 
principle’, which she describes as the tenet that: 
[S]ocialisation is in part a process of assigning situational, i.e. indexical, meanings 
(temporal, spatial, social identity, social act, social activity, affective or epistemic 
meanings) to particular linguistic forms. (1996:410) 
 
This is a particularly useful starting point for politeness scholars because her model 
theorises the act of assigning social meaning to a linguistic form as a pragmatic process, 
and the model is therefore designed to address the link between the social and the 
pragmatic, as well as the global and the local, which is precisely what politeness theories 
attempt to do.  
3.1  The Indexicality Principle (Ochs, 1996) 
In particular Ochs’ work highlights the need for a pragmatic account of the linguistic indexing 
of social identity.  She proposes that aspects of social identity are constructed on the basis 
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of inferred acts and attitudes signalled through the use of specific linguistic forms. The 
distinctions between aspects of social identity that Ochs makes are worth recalling: 
Social identity encompasses all dimensions of social personae, including roles (e.g. 
speaker, overhearer, master of ceremonies, doctor, teacher, coach), relationships 
(e.g. kinship, occupational, friendship, recreational relations), group identity (e.g. 
gender, generation, class, ethnic, religious, educational group membership), and 
rank (e.g. titled and untitled persons, employer and employee), among other 
properties. (1996:410) 
 
A key insight that derives from these distinctions is Ochs’ frequently quoted observation that 
“few features of language directly and exclusively index gender” (341). Her analyses of talk 
show that group identity such as ‘gender’ is likely to be inferred on the basis of the indexing 
of roles, which are in turn inferred on the basis of indexed stances and acts.   
In illustrating the pragmatic processes by which aspects of social identity are 
inferred, Ochs argues, for example, that a role such as ‘doctor’ is likely to be inferred on the 
basis of stance: “one might display the stances of knowledgeability, objectivity and care to 
build a certain kind of medical professional identity” (424).  Stances and acts are defined as 
follows: 
Social act refers to a socially recognized goal-directed behaviour, e.g. a request, an 
offer, a compliment.  
affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as 
degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern. 
epistemic stance refers to knowledge of belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, 
including degrees of certainty of  knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of 
propositions, and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities. (Ochs, 
1996:410) 
It is important to recall that Ochs does not assume that the link between a linguistic structure 
and a social meaning such as an act or a stance is in any way fixed.  She argues, for 
example, that: 
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Interlocutors may use these structures to index a particular identity, affect, or other 
situational meaning; however, others co-present may not necessarily assign the 
same meaning (Ochs 1996:413).  
 
Ochs’ position here is consistent with that of current approaches to the study of 
politeness: no analyst today would want to propose that a specific linguistic resource such 
as the use of the word sorry always indexes a social act such as ‘an apology’, or that the use 
of the word fuck invariably indexes ‘an oppositional stance’.  Indeed it would not be difficult 
to imagine contexts when the use of the word fuck could index an apology and a use of the 
word sorry could index an oppositional stance.  And as a brief glance through any edition of 
the Journal of Politeness Research or this journal will show, much of the current politeness 
research that focuses on communities of practice and activity types brings into view just how 
wide a range of meanings a particular resource or linguistic variable can have. However, I 
would argue that such research is still to provide a sufficiently descriptive and explanatory 
account of how specific social meanings come into existence, what specific meanings a 
resource can index, or how context plays a part in the selection of one meaning rather than 
another. 
 Eckert’s (2008) work on indexicality and sociolinguistic variation goes some way to 
accounting for the way in which linguistic resources come to acquire social meanings.  
Although she does not directly cite Ochs’ work on indexicality (and this possibly accounts for 
the loss of the pragmatic element in the sociolinguistic adaptation of the indexicality 
principle) what Eckert and Ochs share is a focus on the instability of social meaning, and in 
particular a focus on the role of ideology in the generation and perpetuation of social 
meanings.  For example, in questioning the meanings assigned to variables in early 
variationist studies, such as Labov’s claim that the use of centralized /ay/ signals local 
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authenticity within a particular speech community, Eckert argues that “the meanings of 
variables are not precise or fixed but rather constitute a field of potential meanings” 
(2008:454).  She refers to the field of potential meanings that variables can have as an 
‘indexical field’, and describes this as a “constellation of ideologically related meanings, any 
one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable” (2008:454). In developing 
this account, Eckert draws on Agha’s (2003) concept of ‘enregisterment’ and Silverstein’s 
(2003) account of the ‘indexical order’.  The sociolinguistic adoption of this approach has 
already begun to generate a steadily expanding literature.  See, for example, Anderson 
(2008); Cole (2010); Snell (2010) and Squires (2010).  Before addressing the usefulness of 
Eckert’s notion of the indexical field for the analysis of swearword use, it is worth considering 
the concepts of ‘enregisterment’ and the ‘indexical order’ in more depth as they have a 
particular relevance for the development of a systematic approach that can address the 
range of effects that situated uses of swearwords can generate. 
 
3.2 Enregisterment (Agha, 2003) 
Agha’s (2003) account of enregisterment traces the process by which Received 
Pronunciation as a class accent within British English has achieved, and retained, a 
particular prestige.  He shows how, since the eighteenth century, commentaries found in a 
wide range of sources, including books, novels, newspapers and television programmes 
have generated a metadiscourse of RP that has created and continued to reproduce the 
cultural values ascribed to this accent.  Although the accent itself, as well as the specifics of 
the metadiscourse surrounding the accent, have changed over the centuries, Agha shows 
that, within this metadiscourse, RP continues to be associated with personal qualities such 
as having refined manners, good breeding, good education, rationality, etc.  Agha uses the 
term ‘enregisterment’ to refer to the process by which the features of the accent have come 
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to be associated with specific qualities and in doing so have become available as a 
signalling device.   From Agha’s perspective, if a non-native speaker of RP elects to use 
features of RP in a context in which heii is attempting to signal the above personal qualities, 
he would be attempting to align his social identity with that which he ascribes to an RP 
speaker.  But just as significantly he would potentially be endorsing and perpetuating the link 
between intelligence and education and the use of RP.  And, of course, this is also to 
actively subscribe to a highly ideological stance that is promulgated by this specific 
metadiscourse of RP. 
 A key feature of Agha’s argument is that any metapragmatic activity is ideological 
because it is a situated activity: it has a speaker or writer, who has a particular identity and a 
particular set of goals.  Moreover, any metapragmatic act involves speech or writing that is 
located within a specific medium, which has its own set of goals and its own conventions.  
So, for Agha, to talk about the cultural value ascribed to a register is not to talk about an 
abstract phenomenon. He argues that value ascriptions can be located in discourses that 
take place in the public sphere and in individual response, and asks “But what is involved in 
claiming that such cultural values exist at all? For whom do they exist?” (2003:242) and in 
responding to those questions comments: 
In speaking of ‘cultural values’ I wish to invite no metaphysics of shared belief. To 
say that pragmatic behaviours—such as uses of a register—have cultural values 
associated with them is simply to say that certain regularities of evaluative behaviour 
can be observed and documented as data. Indeed, all of the evidence for register 
values presented above consists of data of observable metapragmatic activity. ..Yet 
all such behaviour is unavoidably positioned, by its very nature, as the activity of 
socially locatable persons. (2003:242) 
 
There is insufficient space here to address Agha’s claims in detail, but his work is a useful 
extension of Ochs’ theorisation of social identity as a function of indexicality in that he 
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argues that the metapragmatic activity that is evident in cultural texts draws on and 
perpetuates ‘metapragmatic stereotypes’ which he argues are “identifiable for a particular 
social domain of evaluators, e.g. a particular sub-population within a society” (242).  
Therefore, cultural values are not intrinsic to a register, but are the function of acts of 
interpretation carried out by socially situated evaluators. 
 This is significant because, in common with Ochs, Agha does not assume that 
metapragmatic evaluations will be consistent with each other within a given society, and 
instead argues that “their mutual inconsistency” often provides “crucial evidence for the co-
existence of distinct, socially positioned ideologies of language within a language 
community”.   Agha links these ideologies with the linguistic indexing of social identity by 
proposing that: 
metapragmatic representations expand the social domain of individuals acquainted 
with register stereotypes, and allow individuals, once aware of them, to respond to 
their characterological value in various ways, aligning their own self-images with 
them in some cases, transforming them in others through their own metasemiotic 
work (Agha 2003:242).  
 
His point therefore is that metapragmatic representations provide evidence that accounts for 
how linguistic variables, such as the features of an accent like RP, come to function as a 
resource for the making of meaning and the indexing of social identity.  However he also 
highlights the ideological nature of this process and the extent to which such meanings are 
created, sustained and challenged through on-going acts of evaluation. 
 The relevance of Agha’s work to the concerns of this paper, the evaluation of 
swearword use, is that it has the potential to generate a different set of research questions, 
and a different focus, to those of the studies discussed in Section 2 above, and as such this 
approach has the potential to add a layer of explanation to the findings of those studies.  
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Such an analysis would begin with a search for evidence of regularity in the range of social 
meanings generated by the use of swearwords by analysing the metadiscourses that recur 
across different types of situated cultural text.   Agha’s account would predict that such 
evidence would be found in metapragmatic comments on swearing that occur in the media, 
in the use and responses to swearing that are in cultural texts such as television soaps, 
novels, etc., as well as in the evaluations evident in everyday interaction.  However, 
significantly, this approach would not predict that interlocutors will have equal access to 
either the metadiscourses or the values generated by these metadiscourses, or have the 
same relationship with them.  As (Agha, 2003:242) points out, interlocutors may align their 
own self-images with these social meanings or transform them through their own 
metasemiotic work.   
 Agha’s approach predicts that evidence of a conventionalised understanding of the 
significance of formulae such as swearwords, as well as of alternative understandings, is 
likely to be found in the systematic study of the metadiscourses of swearword use.  This is 
an important step in building up a picture of the processes involved in individual and shared 
evaluations of swearword use.  How these understandings are generated in the first place is 
highly relevant however since, as Agha points out, these are ideologically charged.  That 
issue is addressed by Silverstein’s (2003) notion of the ‘indexical order’, which I briefly 
outline below. 
3.3 The indexical order (Silverstein, 2003) 
Silverstein claims that the notion of an ‘indexical order’ is necessary if we are “to relate the 
micro-social to the macro-social frames of analysis of any sociolinguistic phenomenon” 
(2003:193).  He describes the relationship between Agha’s notion of a register and indexical 
orders as follows: 
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The existence of registers ....is an aspect of the dialectical process of indexical order, 
in which the n +1st-order indexicality depends on the existence of a cultural schema 
of enregisterment of forms perceived to be involved in n–th order indexical 
meaningfulness; the forms as they are swept up in the n +1st order valorization 
become strongly presupposing indexes of that enregistered order, and therefore in 
particular of the ideological ethno-metapragmatics that constitutes it and endows its 
shibboleths with n +1st-order indexical value. (193) 
 
Silverstein’s points here are probably best understood by drawing on Eckert’s (2008) 
application of his insights in her reassessment of Labov’s distinction between indicators, 
markers and stereotypes.  Eckert points out that Labov’s conceptualisation of an indicator is 
what Silverstein would categorise as a 1st order index: 
A first-order index simply indexes membership in a population – it designates people 
as Martha’s Vineyarders, Beijingers, Detroiters. In the case of Labov’s (1966) New 
York City study, which Silverstein uses as his example, the populations may be 
social class strata (Eckert, 2008:463). 
 
An n+1st order index would be a variable that has, in Labov’s terms, become a marker in that 
it is a linguistic variant whose use correlates with variation in style.   As Eckert, following 
Silverstein, points out: a form that has acquired an indexical value can always be re-
interpreted so that it acquires “an n+1st value” (2008:463).   However, an N+1st order index 
has a different significance to the notion of a marker in variationist sociolinguistics in that, 
within an indexical approach, it leads to a focus on the process of meaning making: 
The difference between the notion of marker as used in variation studies and the 
index of Silverstein’s treatment is in the ideological embedding of the process by 
which the link between form and meaning is made and remade. Participation in 
discourse involves a continual interpretation of forms in context, an in-the-moment 
assigning of indexical values to linguistic forms (Eckert, 2008:463).  
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As Eckert points out, what Silverstein’s notion of an indexical order brings to variationist 
sociolinguistics (via Agha’s notion of enregisterment) is an account of how variants come to 
be linked with specific social meanings, and how this linking is an active, on-going process: it 
is through repeated acts of social evaluation carried out by “socially locatable persons” 
(Agha, 2003:242) that makes it possible for a variant to index a specific range of social 
meanings.  This process is explained by Eckert’s development of the notion of the indexical 
field. 
3.4  The Indexical Field (Eckert 2008) 
Eckert articulates the significance of approaching sociolinguistic variation from an indexical 
perspective by showing how, although there is evidence in early variationist studies that the 
meanings attached to variants are ideologically motivated, this evidence is not fully 
recognised or developed in these accounts.  She argues, for example, that Labov 
interpreted the correlation between the centralization of /ay/ and certain categories of people 
in Martha’s Vineyard, as evidence that the meaning of the variation is a local construction: in 
this case it signalled resistance to mainland incursion.  However, as she goes on to argue, 
such local meanings were not actually addressed by Labov, or by subsequent variationist 
sociolinguists.  For example although, as Eckert points out, Trudgill argued that it was the 
“perceived toughness of working-class men” that explained language change in that it led to 
middle-class men adopting regional working-class variants, she goes to argue that this 
account does not address the process by which “meanings become associated with social 
categories or with variables” (Eckert, 2008:455). 
 Following Silverstein (2003), Eckert reinterprets the findings of large-scale social 
surveys from this perspective, showing the significance of explaining the correlational data of 
such surveys as indexical.  Starting from the premise that once an association has been 
20 
made between a social group (for example, a specific class of people in New York) and a 
form used by that group (for example, post-vocalic /r/) that form is available to be used 
indexically (e.g. by a worker in a New York store to indicate something about social status).  
Her argument is that the goal of sociolinguistics today should be to explain how variants 
function by focusing on the ideological field that generates the indexical potential of variants.  
She describes this field as a product of “the continual reconstrual of the indexical value of a 
variable” (Eckert, 2008:463-4).  Her point is also that whenever a linguistic resource is used, 
it has the potential to change that field.  
The field is fluid, and each new activation has the potential to change the field by 
building on ideological connections. Thus variation constitutes an indexical system 
that embeds ideology in language and that is in turn part and parcel of the 
construction of ideology. (453) 
 
4 TOWARDS A DISCURSIVE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE INDEXICAL VALUE 
OF STRONG SWEARWORDS 
Although the indexical approach I have discussed so far provides a framework for exploring 
the scope of the indexical field, I would argue that currently it is, essentially, a sociolinguistic 
rather than a pragmatic approach: it does not describe or explain how, within a specific 
linguistic interaction, the use of a specific resource comes to index a specific stance, a 
specific act, or a specific aspect of social identity.  The approach might give access to the 
meanings a linguistic form can generate, but it does not describe or explain the meaning-
making process itself, or how situated uses can generate specific meanings.  As Wilson 
(2006:1723) observes: if a meaning is pragmatically inferred, “we need an account of how 
the inference is triggered, what form it takes and what types of outputs it yields”.    
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 Blakemore (2011a:120-1) argues that the conceptualisation of both explicatures and 
implicatures as inferences, as it is set out in Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory, 
“does not correspond to any other distinctions that have been made in pragmatics.”  She 
points out that only relevance theory holds that the identification of contextual assumptions 
and conclusions, as well as explicitly communicated propositions, is governed by the same 
pragmatic principle.  In a more recent work, Sperber and Wilson build on this view of the 
inferential nature of explicatures, drawing on research that has “cast doubt on the view that 
word meanings can be analysed in terms of context-independent prototypes, and suggests 
instead that ad hoc meanings are constructed in context” (Sperber and Wilson, 2011:157).  
In particular the following claims about the nature of linguistic encoding inform my analysis: 
[T]he occurrence of a word in an utterance provides a piece of evidence, a pointer to 
a concept involved in the speaker’s meaning.  It may so happen that the intended 
concept is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its strictly 
literal sense. However, we would argue that this is no more than a possibility, not a 
preferred or default interpretation.  Any interpretation, whether literal or not results 
from mutual adjustment of the explicit and implicit content of the utterance.  This 
adjustment process stabilises when the hypothesised implicit content is warranted by 
the hypothesised explicit content together with the context, and when the overall 
interpretation is warranted by (the particular instantiation of) the communicative 
principle of relevance.  
 
Following Sperber and Wilson (1986); Wilson and Sperber (2004), Carston (2009) and 
Sperber and Wilson (2011) my analysis is predicated on the following axioms: 
I. The identification of the explicit content of an utterance is as inferential a process as the 
recovery of implicatures.   
II. Context does not precede an utterance, but is a function of utterance interpretation.  
The context of an utterance is a set of assumptions assigned by the hearer in the 
process of interpreting an utterance.  The context of an utterance from this perspective 
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is the specific set of assumptions that a hearer or reader activates when generating the 
most relevant interpretation (to her) of the particular linguistic forms, intonations 
patterns, etc. that constitute the utterance.  
III. The range of meanings that a specific use of a strong swearword is assigned will have 
been derived from the pool of assumptions that make up the individual cognitive 
environments of individual interlocutors.  However, I do not assume that the cognitive 
environment of one interlocutor will overlap with that of another.   
In what follows my aim is to show that an approach that links relevance theory to the 
sociolinguistic theorisation of indexicality can help to explain the generation of specific social 
meanings ascribed to specific uses of swearwords.  I begin with evidence of the 1st order 
indexing potential of strong swearwords, then consider evidence that these forms have been 
‘swept up in the N + 1st order valorization’ process by which they become ‘strongly 
presupposing indexes of that enregistered order’ (Silverstein, 2003:193).  I then use 
newspaper reports to show that regularities in the register values assigned to swearword 
use are evident in examples of situated metapragmatic commentary.  Finally, I show how 
these ideologically related meanings are activated in evaluations of specific uses of 
swearwords.  
 
4.1 Strong swearwords as a first order index.  
McEnery and Xiao’s (2004) analysis of the British National Corpora is an example of a large 
scale survey that provides evidence of correlations between social groups and the use of 
swearwords.  Here I summarise just those aspects of their findings that indicate a 
relationship between gender, class and the use of fuck as these illustrate patterns of 
behaviour that would suggest that the use of the word is associated with a specific 
population and therefore that it functions as a 1st order index.  The tables below are adapted 
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from the McEnery and Xiao’s (2004:242-4) findings to show the net result of uses of fuck, 
fucked, fucks, fucking and fucker according the speaker gender, and a cross tabulation 
which incorporates the data for gender and for class (RF is the raw frequency and NF is the 
normalised frequency).   
Table 1 Use of all forms of the word fuck by speaker gender 
Gender       Words RF NF Sig. level 
Male 4,918,075  1779  361.73  <0.001 
Female  3,255,533  444  136.38  
 
The authors observe that when all word forms are taken as a whole, male speakers use fuck 
more than twice as often as female speakers, which is statistically significant.  However, as 
the authors point out, when the results were broken down to take into account variation in 
the use of specific forms, they point even more strongly to a predominantly male use of fuck 
as a swearword.  They argue, for example that frequencies of male and female speakers’ 
use of the specific words fucked and fucks is not significant, and that this might be because 
these two word forms can denote the ‘literal’ meaning of the word.  When word forms were 
analysed individually they found that the variation between male and female speakers’ use 
of the word fucking (for which the normalised frequency is Male: 283.44 and Female: 98.6) is 
even more strongly suggestive of a predominantly male use than the above figures indicate.
 The table below indicates that variation between male and female use of fuck is 
evident across all four classes, and also indicates that its use correlates strongly with the 
population ‘working class males’.    
Table 2: Use of the word fuck: cross-tabulation of speaker gender and social class 
Class  Gender  Words  RF  NF  Sig. level 
AB  Male 266,857  175  655.78  <0.001 
 Female  413,150  127  307.39  
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C1  Male  187,946  43  228.79  <0.001 
 Female  239,926  3  12.5  
C2  Male  169,737  348  2050.23  <0.001 
 Female  315,945  9 28.49  
DE  Male  126,512  176  1391.17  <0.001 
 Female  138,247  84  607.61  
As McEnery (2006: 5) points out “While corpus data allows us to describe swearing in 
English, for example, it does not begin to provide an explanation for anything that we see 
within the corpus”.   However, even though this is only one set of data, and it can only 
indicate tendencies, it does provide preliminary evidence that, at a particular moment in 
British culture, the word fuck is most likely to be used by a specific population: working class 
males (although the results for the AB and DE class raise some interesting questions that 
are worth investigating further). 
 The sociolinguistic approach to indexicality proposes that “variables index 
demographic categories not directly but indirectly, through their association with qualities 
and stances that enter into the construction of categories” (Eckert, 2008:455).  The 
correlation between population and word-use would suggest that the word fuck has the 
potential to be transformed from a 1st order index (strong swear words→working class 
males) so that it acquires an n+1st value.  On the basis of folk-linguistic knowledge as well 
as sociological evidence, the link between the population ‘working class males’ and the use 
of vernacular forms, including swearwords, has clearly been subject to such a process for 
some time.  But observing that such a correlation exists tells us nothing about how it is that 
“meanings become associated with social categories or with variables” (Eckert, 2008:455).  
And without an engagement with those processes there can be no explanation for how such 
associations come and go, or how they change over time.  It also cannot tell us anything 
about whether all members of a society make those associations, or just some members.  
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Before considering how these processes might be addressed, it is worth setting out 
evidence from empirical studies of language-use that suggests the scope of the indexical 
field of strong swearwords. 
 Stapleton’s (2010) consideration of the interpersonal function of swearwords 
provides a useful overview of the cultural values that have been ascribed to the use of 
strong swearwords, and shows that these ascriptions draw on (and perpetuate) stereotypes 
of the population ‘working class males’.  In her report she surveys studies that chart a 
perceived link between socio-economic class and swearing and these offer some evidence 
of the enregistered order that might be indexed by swearword use.  She observes that:  
in most languages, swearing is strongly linked to the vernacular, thereby carrying 
connotations of “working class culture” and lower socioeconomic groupings [...]. In 
terms of social judgments, this means that the use of expletives is often associated 
with lower levels of education and/or socioeconomic standing; as reflective of 
standard versus non-standard language use (2010:291) 
 
Stapleton goes on to argue that, “Because of its associations with both aggression and 
vernacular/slang, swearing has traditionally been seen as the preserve of male speakers” 
(293).  Her account shows therefore that a specific set of ideological connections is clearly in 
play when swearword use is evaluated.  The studies she surveys show that informants are 
linking swearing with aggressive behaviour and vernacular use, and also linking all three 
behaviours with a specific population: working class males.   
 Interpreting Stapleton’s survey data from an indexical perspective therefore, it can be 
seen as evidence that these forms have been re-interpreted so that they acquire an  “n +1st 
value” (Eckert, 2008:463) process.  From Silverstein’s perspective this would predict that 
when strong swearwords are used by a population other than that presupposed by the 1st 
order index, they will be subject to an on-going set of cultural evaluations based on register 
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stereotyping, which is to say that these specific forms of taboo language will have become 
“strongly presupposing indexes of that enregistered order” (Silverstein, 2003:193).  There is 
evidence that upholds this prediction in Stapleton’s survey.  She points out, for example, that  
“the ‘popular myth’ surrounding linguistic taboo [...] means that swearing inevitably acquires 
different meanings, and therefore functions differently, for male and female users”  
(2010:293).  Even though, as she observes, some studies have shown that there are 
actually “few gender differences in overall knowledge and usage” of swearwords (2010:293), 
there is still evidence that men’s and women’s use of strong swearwords is judged in the 
context of masculine stereotyping, and as a result women’s use of swearwords is perceived 
as inappropriate.    
 Stapleton’s findings on swearword use are consistent with variationist explanations of 
gender and language-use that have been proposed in the past, where men’s language-use 
has been accounted for by an assumed orientation towards covert prestige values.  
However, as Eckert (2008:455) points out, such explanations are “vague about the nature of 
the connection between toughness, gender, and class”.   Stapleton’s survey of studies 
provides plenty of evidence that the connection exists and, importantly, also indicates that 
this connection is reproduced through the acts of evaluation carried out by the informants of 
the studies.  In the next section, I analyse one set of cultural texts in order to show how they 
display evaluations of swearword use that make explicit the ideological bases of this 
connection, and potentially keep that connection active.    
 
4.2 The indexical field of strong swearwords in British news reports.  
In what follows I report on an analysis of a corpus of newspaper reports made available by 
the database Nexis which shows that the use of strong swearwords is regularly rationalised 
in ways that explicitly link affective stances, social roles and group identities to the register 
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stereotyping discussed above.   In searches over the period of March 2011 to February 2012 
of newspaper reports where the lexeme swear features in the headline or the by-line, a 
preliminary analysis has brought to light two types of news report that evaluate swearing.  
Firstly, there are reports that comment in some way on swearing as behaviour, where the 
focus is not on actual instances of swearword use.  Examples of this type are reports that 
discuss advice given to police officers not to arrest people for swearing (“Swearing at the 
police is no crime, rules judge.” The Daily Telegraph 21st November 2011).  Other examples 
of this first type are where an incident of swearing has led to a general discussion of when or 
if it is appropriate to swear (“Radio clampdown on bad language to protect children.” Daily 
Mail 21st December 2011).  Although this first type of report yields interesting results, there 
is space here only to focus on some examples of a second type of news report: those which 
comment on specific incidents where swearwords have been used.  I focus on this type of 
report in order to show how evaluations of swearword use are supported by rationalisations 
that draw on underlying assumptions about when the use of strong swearwords is and is not 
acceptable.  
 The reports are situated texts (in Agha’s terms): the evaluations take place within the 
newspaper setting and therefore are a product of the genre which would include, for 
example a specific agenda: the goal of such a report might be to sensationalise an act or 
raise public concern about an issue in order to engage as wide a readership as possible and 
therefore sell more newspapers.  And since the reports are designed for a mass readership, 
any evaluation has to be rationalised by drawing on relatively uncontroversial perceptions of 
swearword use if it is to be meaningful to that readership.  From a relevance-theoretical 
perspective, then, the reports assume (but cannot guarantee) that the author and potential 
readers have a ‘mutual cognitive environment’, in the sense that key assumptions that are 
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accessible to one are accessible to the other.  More importantly, however, these 
assumptions are the starting point, not the end-point of the communication process.  As 
Blakemore (2011b:3541) has argued, “communication is not geared towards the duplication 
of thoughts, but rather to what Sperber and Wilson describe as the enlargement of mutual 
cognitive environments.iii”  
 My claim is that since, from a relevance-theoretical perspective, context is a function 
of an utterance, the evaluations of swearwords in newspaper reports provide evidence of 
two sets of assumptions: (a) the mutually manifest contextual assumptions about general 
swearword use that the evaluations require a reader to generate if she is to be able to 
interpret the propositions she assigns to the report as relevant (and which assumptions 
provide indirect evidence of the mutual cognitive environment of the writer and the assumed 
reader); and (b) the implicatures generated by evaluations of specific uses of swearwords in 
the reports: the specific implicated premises (contextual assumptions) supplied by the 
reader that enable the reader to infer the implicated conclusions (contextual implications) 
communicated by the writer when evaluation specific acts of swearing.  
 My point is that although the reports appeal to (and provide evidence of) shared 
assumptions about swearword use, it is the subset of those assumptions, activated in the 
process of generating a relevant interpretation of a report, that explains context-specific 
interpretations of swearwords.   To illustrate my point, in what follows I focus on just two 
incidents of swearing and one ‘implied’ use of a swearword that occurred in 2011.  The first 
was an incident in which the British football player Wayne Rooney ran up to a television 
camera after he had scored a goal and shouted “You fucking beauty” into it.  This incident 
resulted in a hearing at which the Football Association (FA) banned the player for two 
matches.  The actions of the FA as well as Rooney’s behaviour were the subject of a great 
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deal of debate in the British press in the subsequent weeks.  The second is an incident when 
the actor Gwyneth Paltrow said on an American television show that her grandmother was 
“a real cunt”.  This incident was also subject to some limited debate in the British press.  The 
third is an incident on a BBC radio programme, The News Quiz, in which the compere, 
Sandi Toksvig, said: “It’s the Tories who  have put the “n” into cuts.”   
 I begin with an indication of the indexical field of the use of strong swearwords where 
the metapragmatic commentary constructs their use as normal in certain circumstances.  In 
particular I show that there is a metadiscourse of swearing that legitimises one social 
group’s use of swearwords when that swearing takes place within certain parameters of use.  
I also show that in instances of swearing that do not map onto these parameters, this same 
metadiscourse is used to evaluate uses of swearwords negatively.  However, what these 
evaluations also show is that these uses of swearwords are likely to have been evaluated 
quite differently by other social groups, and would suggest that there are other, conflicting, 
metadiscourses of swearing that exist alongside those informed by the dominant ideology 
evident here, and which would repay further investigation. 
4.2.1 Evidence of a metadiscourse that normalises swearword use 
Each of the reports discussed in this section is triggered by Rooney’s specific act of 
swearing at the camera. There are many more implications to be drawn from an analysis of 
these reports, here I have limited my account to show that each refers to swearing in general 
terms and each, in invoking a set of contextual assumptions (CAs) for interpreting the use of 
swearwords generates contextual implications (CIs) that normalise occurrences of swearing 
by football players during football matches.  What is particularly interesting here is that these 
CIs are generated by different sets of CAs. 
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 This contextual implication generated by the italicised element of the following report 
illustrates this: 
We hired expert lip readers to scan live games and highlights on TV for players using 
obscene language.  Newcastle skipper Joey Barton told the ref, the opposition and 
even his own players to "f*** off", while Wolves boss Mick McCarthy was spotted 
telling one of his players to "f*****g stay there". [....] Former team-mate Gary Neville 
defended him [Rooney], saying: "If swearing is a crime worthy of a two-game ban, 
there will be nobody left on the pitch." [my italics] (Foul! Wayne Rooney isn’t the only 
one swearing for the camera as one weekend of TV football shows. The Mirror April 
12, 2011) 
 
The pragmatically generated explicatures of the italicised element here require some degree 
of narrowing.  For example, nobody must be narrowed to signify ‘no footballers’ and on the 
pitch must be narrowed to signify ‘on the football field during a game of football’.  If the 
explicatures of the italicised element of Neville’s utterance are something like: “if swearing 
on the football pitch is banned there will be no footballers available to play in matches” then 
interpreted in conjunction with the CA: “football matches can’t be played unless footballers 
are on the pitch” then the CI would be something like: “If football matches are to be played 
then footballers must be allowed to swear”.   What makes this interpretation relevant in the 
context of the propositions expressed in the remainder of the article is that it justifies the use 
of swearing on the pitch: if, given the evidence that football players swear on the pitch, 
swearing was to incur a ban, then all players will be banned.  For football to continue, then 
swearing in games of football must continue.   
 The second report also generates a CI that normalises swearing on the football pitch, 
but in this case, this interpretation is generated by an assumed link between the football field 
with the workplace, and this link accounts for the FA’s previous lack of reaction to Rooney’s 
swearing. 
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In May 2005, in one match with Arsenal alone, he [Rooney] was caught swearing at 
referee Graham Poll at least 20 times. The FA did not act, despite the incident being 
highlighted, because they understand the football field to be a workplace and 
industrial language part of its currency [my italics]. (Time for United’s Moral Minority 
to move on. Daily Mail April 27, 2011) 
 
If the propositions expressed by the italicised part of the final sentence here are to be read 
as an explanation of the FA’s lack of action, the reader needs to supply a set of implicated 
premises which together with the explicatures of the utterance generate the implicated 
conclusion: “swearing is to be expected on the football field”. 
Specifically, these CAs include the presuppositions that: 
(a) the football field is a workplace setting 
(b) swearing always occurs in workplace settings. 
 
For these premises to be interpreted as relevant CAs, the explicitly communicated element 
must be pragmatically modified so that the term workplace is narrowed to signify ‘industrial 
workplaces’, and the ‘loose use’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2007) of the item industrial language 
is narrowed to signify ‘swearing’.  The CI “swearing is to be expected on the football field” 
can therefore be justified in the following terms: if the football field is an industrial workplace 
and swearing always occurs in industrial workplaces, then swearing will occur on the football 
field.  What makes this a relevant interpretation of the italicised elements in the context of 
the remainder of the article is that it explains why the FA had not responded to Rooney’s 
previous swearword use. The evaluation of swearing in this report then is that swearing is 
unremarkable in certain circumstances.   I would also argue that, in British culture, working 
out what those circumstances are requires the reader to be able to link a particular type of 
workplace to the use of swearing: i.e. industrial rather than, say, office workplaces; and to 
link this to working class rather than middle class work. 
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 A third report that also rationalises swearing as normal in football matches does so 
through linking swearing with emotion: 
"It happens 20 times every match. I can't understand why this [Rooney’s swearing] is 
different. You can't take emotion out of football." [my italics] (What they @!*$@*! said 
about Roo's ban. Sun April 9, 2011) 
 
For the proposition expressed by the final sentence to be interpreted as relevant, the reader 
has to pragmatically generate a set of explicatures that involve the narrowing of the word 
emotion to signify ‘swearing’.    If the explicatures are taken to be: 
(a) emotion [in the sense of swearing] is an intrinsic part of playing football 
 
And if the contextual implication that derives from the co-text functions here as a relevant 
contextual assumption: 
(b) Rooney swears twenty times in every match  
 
then the contextual implication generated by the synthesis of (a) and (b) is that  
(c) There is no reason to see the Rooney’s current swearing as exceptional. 
 
 These reports would suggest that the pragmatically generated indexical field of 
strong swearwords is that their use potentially indexes social roles such as football player 
and industrial worker, aspects of social identity such as belonging to the groups ‘men’ and 
‘working-class’, and potentially indexes an ‘emotive’ affective stance.   In what follows I show 
that this same indexical field informs reports that explicitly evaluate Rooney’s utterance “You 
fucking beauty”.   
 
4.2.2 Uses of the normalisation of swearing metadiscourse to rationalise negative 
evaluations of Rooney’s swearing. 
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The extracts I discuss in this section illustrate how the CAs identified above are activated in 
generating relevant interpretations of reports that evaluate Rooney’s act of swearing as a 
misjudgement on his part.  The following extract implies this through the list of inappropriate 
contexts for swearing it offers: 
Spurs boss Harry Redknapp said: "I wouldn't expect my players to run up to a 
camera and swear no more than I would have to tell them 'Don't mug an old lady on 
the way home'.  
"Why do you have to go up and swear into the camera when there's kids watching? 
We don't need it.  
"It depends what your morals are.  Some people swear in front of women which I 
don't understand."  (Ferguson ramps up FA feud to keep United on the boil;  
Scot creates siege mentality at Old Trafford by claiming governing body pressurised 
referee over Rooney rant. Sun April 9, 2011) 
 
The references to mugging and not swearing in front of children and women here are 
relevant if the reader supplies the CAs: 
(a) old ladies should not be mugged 
(b) children and women should not be exposed to swearing 
 
This evaluation of Rooney’s swearing draws on the indexical field of swearword use set out 
above.  The acceptability of swearing in an adult, male environment is implied by its contrast 
with the list of proscribed behaviour: it is not swearing itself that is proscribed, it is doing so 
in the wrong environment.  There is a further ideological link being generated here: 
Redknapp’s evaluation draws on and perpetuates a register stereotype of a type of man 
whose lack of morals is evident through their treatment of women: whether it is mugging 
them or swearing in front of them (and indeed to interpret his utterance as meaningful, these 
two acts need to be seen as equivalent in some way).  And Redknapp’s professed inability 
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to understand such behaviour constructs a persona for himself as someone who would not 
behave towards women in this way. 
 This view that Rooney’s swearing is an act of misjudgement is also evident in the 
following quotation from a former referee: 
"But you wouldn't swear in the face of your parents like that, you wouldn't do it in 
church and you wouldn't let off steam like that in the middle of a crowded 
supermarket, so why should you get away with it at a football match which is being 
shown all over the world live on TV?" (Ref Rage:  FA put Rooney official under unfair 
pressure claim colleagues. The Mirror April 8, 2011) 
 
Here the implicated premises include the CA:  “swearing in front of one’s parents or in a 
church is not acceptable”.  The reader also has to make a link between swearing and 
emotion.  For the proposition in the second italicised clause to be perceived as relevant, the 
phrase let off steam, which has the potential to signify ‘express emotion’ through a range of 
forms, has to be narrowed here to signify ‘express emotion through swearing’.  Also the term 
crowded supermarket has to be broadened to signify ‘in public’.  These pragmatic inferences 
about the explicit meaning of these clauses are necessary if the causal connection implied 
by the word so is to be justified here.  The interpretation here is that if 
(a) in a public place, it is wrong to express strong emotion through swearing 
and 
(b) a televised football match is a public space 
then 
(c) it is unacceptable to express strong emotion through swearing in a televised 
football match.   
 
Note again that the act is condemned because it is seen as a misjudgement about where 
swearing should occur rather than because swearing itself is to be condemned.  Note also 
that the writer here is, in listing proscribed behaviour and raising questions about Rooney’s 
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expectations, also constructing his persona in opposition to that of a man who swears in the 
wrong context and is unable to control the expression of emotion. 
 The metadiscursive construction of swearing as an expression of emotion is also 
employed in the following example which again evaluates Rooney’s behaviour as misguided: 
What his swearing did have, though, was a deep, deep, painful anger. Which is, I 
guess, why even I was taken aback. Swearing is normally just swearing. But 
Rooney's swearing was something else. It wasn't Rooney's words that counted, it 
was the thought behind them. It was about what he thinks we think of him. And that 
thought was thick with violence and anger and hatred. He opened not just his mouth 
but his heart to us. And that, we learnt, was not a nice place to be. (What the…?  
Sport loses its way in a four-letter moral maze. The Independent April 6, 2011) 
 
Rooney’s swearing is evaluated as misguided here on the grounds that it constitutes an 
uncontrolled exposure of deeply felt emotions.  The reader needs to activate the CA 
(a)  the public display of “deep painful anger” is inappropriate  
 
if she is to interpret the clause “even I was taken aback” as relevant.  Again, the writer here 
is indexing his own stance as someone who can see swearing as “just swearing” in some 
contexts, but he constructs this incident as the behaviour of a man who is unable to control 
his emotions, and therefore is doing more than “just swearing”.   
 The link between swearing and emotion is also invoked in this final example: 
What made Rooney's behaviour all the more puzzling was the fact that, at the end of 
a troubled year on and off the pitch, he had just completed a fantastic hat-trick to 
haul his team back from the brink of a defeat that would have damaged their title 
hopes.  'Why do some of these young players have to be so angry with the world?' 
asked Tottenham boss Harry Redknapp last night. 'They're getting hundreds of 
thousands of pounds to play.'  There are no easy answers. (First it was Fergie, now 
they are tackling his biggest star. Daily Mail April 5, 2011) 
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In his evaluation of Rooney’s swearing, Redknapp refers to the amount of money footballers 
such as Rooney are paid.  If the reader generates the implicated premise that ‘people who 
are paid a lot of money have no right to be angry at the world’ she is able to draw the CI that 
Rooney as no right to be angry at the world.  However, the CA that swearing is a reflex of a 
strong emotion such as anger is treated as mutually manifest and as not requiring an explicit 
rationalisation.  The point here is that if Rooney’s anger cannot be justified then his swearing 
cannot be justified. 
  
4.2.3 Uses of the normalisation of swearing metadiscourse to rationalise negative 
evaluations of Paltrow’s and Toksvig’s swearing 
 The following are reports in British newspapers of Gwyneth Paltrow’s use of the word cunt 
on an American television chat show, and Sandi Toksvig’s implied use of the word in a 
British radio programme.  The aim here is to show that where the metadiscourse is 
employed in these instances, it draws on a slightly different, but connected, set of CAs.   
When Paltrow swears, she and the host of the show she is appearing on are discussing their 
dislike of their respective grandmothers, and Paltrow’s response follows the host’s comment 
that her own grandmother “was a bitch.”  Both women are laughing during the talk, as are 
the audience.  
 I propose, in what follows, that the reports in the British press generate the CI that 
Paltrow’s use of the word cunt lacks ‘authenticity’.  The first report cited here evaluates the 
swearword use as designed to shock the audience for the sake of self-promotion.  
 And there seemed to be something curiously staged about the incident.  Was 
Paltrow just trying to be edgy and cool on late-night television?  Or – even worse – 
did she swear merely to grab attention and help promote her new cookbook.  
(Gwynnie, I swear you’re an old phoney. Mail Online April 30th 2011)  
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Here the label phoney implies that whatever social identity Paltrow is attempting to index 
through her swearword use here, it has not been successfully indexed, and this failure is 
down to the lack of authenticity in her swearword use. The use of the word ‘staged’ is 
relevant only if a reader is able to interpret the pragmatically inferred explicature: 
(a) Paltrow’s use of the swearword was not spontaneous 
 
in the context of the implicated premise that: 
(b) Uses of swearwords that are not spontaneous are inappropriate 
 
and is therefore able to generate the CI:  
(c) Paltrow’s use of the swearword is inappropriate 
 
In the indexical field mapped out above, the use of strong swearwords is to be expected 
when speakers respond to emotion or where it is justified by an aspect of social identity: i.e. 
if the speaker is male and working class.  If this is the measure of appropriate swearword 
use in the metadiscourse, then Paltrow’s swearword use is not appropriate. 
 Moreover, in the above report, and a second report cited below, it is implied that the 
reason Paltrow’s use of the word was unacceptable was because it was designed to index 
an aspect of social identity that she was not entitled to index.  In the above report the 
features of that identity are named as edgy and cool, in the report below as a bad girl. 
 
WHO does Gwyneth Paltrow think she is? Seems like she doesn't know any longer... 
She can't pretend this slipped out accidentally like Janet Jackson's wardrobe 
malfunction. Any seasoned performer who uses this kind of language on TV does it 
on purpose.  Gwynnie's been Hollywood's goody-two-shoes for so long and she's 
trying very hard to be a bad girl. Trying too hard I reckon. (Hollywood trucker girl. The 
Express April 30th, 2011) 
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In this second report, the claim that Paltrow’s behaviour can’t be explained as an accident 
implies that an accidental use of taboo language might be acceptable.  What makes her 
behaviour unacceptable therefore is that it is, again, because it is intentional.  It cannot be 
explained away as a spontaneous emotional reaction, or simply the expression of her 
identity as a ‘bad girl’.    
 One final example of a negative evaluation of swearing that derives from the 
employment of the metadiscourse is particularly interesting in that it brings together a 
number of the CAs identified above.  On a BBC programme, The News Quiz, Sandi Toksvig 
cited the line: “It’s the Tories who have put the “n” into cuts.”  Even though in this instance a 
swearword was not actually used, but implied, the occurrence still led to a debate in the 
press and a call by MPs to have the standards of the BBC investigated since the programme 
was broadcast at a time when children might have heard it.  The BBC defended the 
programme, saying the swear word ‘had lost much of its ‘shock value’” (Daily Telegraph 6th 
June 2011, p.7).  A commentator who took issue with this defence by the BBC evaluated the 
use of swear words as follows: 
It is simply not true to declare that the expletive has lost its shock value. It is a term 
of abuse. And — witty or not — Sandi was deliberately invoking it to abuse the 
Conservative Party, in that leery, sniggering, News Quiz style [....] A broadcaster 
making a slip of the tongue [...] is one thing, but to choose to allow the taboo to be 
broken (even if obliquely) in a pre-recorded programme, and then defend the 
decision by saying that times have changed . . . it’s disingenuous, devious and 
dishonest. (Prime-time smut, vile obscenities on Radio 4 and a smug elite who sneer 
at the silent majority. Mail Online June 6th 2011) 
 
Again, the CI here is that artful, insincere uses of swearwords are not acceptable uses. To 
interpret the first italicised elements of the report here as relevant, it is necessary to 
generate the implicated premise that uses of swearwords are acceptable only if they are the 
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spontaneous expression of a particular type of identity, and that to pretend otherwise is 
“disingenuous, devious and dishonest”.  And moreover the type of identity that might be 
indexed through the use of strong swearwords is certainly not the ‘smug elite’ that is referred 
to in the second italicised element, which is the title of the piece.   
 The evaluations of the use of cunt by Paltrow, and the implied use of the word by 
Toksvig are clearly drawing on the metadiscourses outlined above, in which swearing under 
certain circumstances is acceptable: the criticisms presuppose the truth of the propositions 
that form that metadiscourse.  These instances are therefore not legitimised in the activities 
of the ‘socially locatable persons’ whose views are promulgated in the specific sections of 
the national press I have cited here.  The evaluations nicely illustrate Agha’s argument that 
the metapragmatic activity evident in cultural texts draws on and perpetuates 
‘metapragmatic stereotypes’ which he argues are “identifiable for a particular social domain 
of evaluators, e.g. a particular sub-population within a society” (242).  However, as I 
indicated above, Agha also argues that metapragmatic evaluations, because they are 
ideological, will be not be consistent across a given society.  This would predict that there 
are likely to be alternative metadiscourses of swearing that are not being activated in the 
sorts of media text I have cited.  I would argue, in particular that there is a metadiscourse of 
women’s legitimate uses of swearwords that is still to be mapped, both within and beyond 
such texts, which would bring these inconsistencies into view.  The fact that Toksvig and 
Paltrow used or implied the use of a swearword that is perceived as one of the strongest in 
British English would presuppose the existence of such a metadiscourse.  And it would, in 
Agha’s (2003: 242) terms, provide “evidence for the co-existence of distinct, socially 
positioned ideologies of language within a language community”. 
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5  CONCLUSION 
This preliminary mapping of the indexical field of swearing even within this very limited 
context brings to light evidence of the ideology of swearing that informs and justifies specific 
evaluations of actual uses.  There is a great deal still to be explored here about the 
ideological stances evident in the metadiscursive commentary that links the use of strong 
swearwords with affective stances such as anger or hatred, with roles such as ‘football 
player’ and ‘industrial worker’, and aspects of social identity, such as membership of the 
social groups ‘male’ and ‘working class’.  While these links have been claimed by previous 
scholarship, and while metapragmatic comments have been explored in previous 
scholarship, here it is based on evidence of “regularities of evaluative behaviour” (Agha, 
2003:242) that charts the activation of these ideological connections in the justification of 
situated interpretations of a specific act of swearing.  
 Rooney is not condemned for swearing per se.  The analysis shows that, within the 
identified metadiscourse, the use of strong swearwords is to be expected by a man in a 
specific work environment, and it is to be expected of someone experiencing strong 
emotions.  Where Rooney’s swearing is evaluated as unacceptable, it is because it is not 
hidden from people who, according to this metadiscourse, should be protected from being 
exposed to swearing, and because it indicates that he is not able to stop himself from 
publicly displaying strong emotions.  This mapping also provides evidence of the ideologies 
that are activated when the uses of swearwords by groups other than working class males 
are evaluated.   The normalisation of swearing as behaviour that is associated with the 
expression of emotion and with working class, male workplaces informs comments which 
were critical of Rooney, as well as those that evaluated his swearing as justified in some 
way, or else empathised with it.  My analysis of Paltrow’s use of the word cunt and Toksvig’s 
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implied use of the word suggest that these same associations are used to construct these 
uses as inappropriate.  These reports imply that swearword use that is not justified within the 
terms of this metadiscourse is to some extent delegitimised.  However, as Eckert argues, an 
indexical field is fluid, and “each new activation has the potential to change the field by 
building on ideological connections” (453).  The existence of such a metadiscourse does not 
rule out the existence of others, and does not rule out the possibility that other 
metadiscourse are already in existence and have the potential to change the scope of the 
indexical field of strong swearwords..  
 In this paper I have argued that approaching linguistic formulae from an indexical 
perspective can generate a set of research questions that have the potential to open up the 
study of (im)politeness phenomena so that it is possible to address the range of meanings a 
resource might generate in a given culture at a given moment in time, without relying on 
assumptions about the shared ‘core’ meaning of that resource.  My argument is that this 
approach allows the claim that the effects of swearwords are conventionalised (Culpeper, 
2011: 127) to be explored in a more systematic way.  It also allows the claim to be 
addressed discursively. In showing some of the regularities that come to light through a 
mapping of the indexical field of strong swearwords, I have shown that the evaluative 
behaviour evident in news reports can be used to explain the meanings ascribed to specific 
uses of taboo language.  I have also argued that approaching these evaluations from a 
relevance-theoretical perspective, the process whereby indexical values are assigned to 
swearwords is brought into view.   
 There are clearly many more social meanings indexed by strong swearwords than 
those addressed by these newspaper texts.  For example, there is a whole metadiscourse of 
women’s use of swearwords that is still to be mapped, and which does not feature in the 
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media texts that I have addressed.  I believe that it is not accidental the two latter 
evaluations of swearword use by women were evaluated as inauthentic.  But that is for 
another project. There are many questions about the indexing potential of strong 
swearwords, and how it relates to the location of different metadiscourses of swearing that 
have yet to be addressed. 
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i Eckert (2012, 87) describes this third wave approach as including the following tenets: (a)  “the meanings of 
variables are underspecified, gaining more specific meanings in the context of styles” and (b) “variation does 
not simply reflect, but also constructs, social meaning and hence is a force in social change”. 
ii In the tradition of relevance theorists, I use he to refer to a communicator, and she to refer to the interpreter of 
an act of communication. 
iii Blakemore (2011, 3541) glosses a cognitive environment as “the set of assumptions that an individual is 
capable of representing at any given time. A mutual cognitive environment is a cognitive environment which is 
shared by a group of individuals and in which it is manifest that they share it with each other.” 
